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International Right and Kant’s World-Federation
Abstract: 
Recent interpretations of Kant’s international political philosophy have 
argued that the formation of a coercive world-state (Völkerstaat) is morally 
required. While these interpretations highlight the importance of a strong 
world government, they ignore Kant’s alternative to a Völkerstaat, a 
world-federation (Völkerbund). For both theoretical and practical reasons, 
the Völkerbund plays a crucial role in cosmopolitan right, and Kant can 
only justifiably reject the formation of the Völkerstaat because of the 
structure of the Völkerbund. This article explains the constitution and 
functions of the Völkerbund, and thereby shows why Kant was not 
ultimately committed to supporting a coercive world-state. 
 In his later political writing, Kant advocates the formation of a world-federation, or 
Völkerbund, and often repudiates the formation of a coercive Völkerstaat. Recently, there 
have been three distinct interpretations of what this repudiation actually means for Kant’s 
complete system of International Right. In the first reading, advocated by Kevin Dodson 
and Jürgen Habermas, (1) Kant’s system actually requires a strong Völkerstaat with the 
power to compel peace in order to establish a complete rule of law.  In his surrounding 1
works, Kant makes commitments that require a Völkerstaat for the sake of theoretical 
consistency, even if Kant seems to deny it in some passages. In the second reading, (2) 
the denial of the Völkerstaat is absolute. Not only does Kant repudiate a world-state, but 
1 As Dodson writes, “No state can seriously expect the united power of the whole to protect it when each 
state is able to exempt itself from such service as it sees fit” (5). Habermas similarly writes, “Habermas: 
“Kant’s concept of a permanent federation of nations that respects the sovereignty of each is, as I have 
shown, inconsistent. The rights of the world citizen must be institutionalized in such a way that it 
actually binds individual governments” (127). Also see Pogge (1988), Allan Wood (1998), Carson 
(1988), Hoffe (1995) and Lutz-Bachmann (1997) (cited in Kleigeld n.3)
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his system does not require it for theoretical consistency. Kant gives adequate reason to 
show that a central coercive power should not be instituted at all, even if his earlier work 
might seem sympathetic to it.  Most recently, a third reading has been advanced by 2
Pauline Kleingeld and Georg Cavallar that aims to reconcile these first two 
interpretations.  This third view holds that (3) the Völkerstaat is long-term aim in Kant’s 3
system but that Kant recommends the non-coercive Völkerbund as an intermediate step to 
foster a cosmopolitan ethos, which eventually produces Kant’s ideal of the Völkerstaat 
without directly imposing it. 
 A primary motivation for the first and third readings is an analogy between the 
domestic and international state of nature. Kant frequently uses this comparison to 
explain why states must yield to a central authority. 
Just as omnilateral violence and the need arising from it must finally bring a 
people to decide… to enter into a civil condition, so too must the need arising 
from the constant wars by which states in turn try to encroach upon or 
subjugate one another at last bring them, even against their will, to enter into a 
cosmopolitan constitution.  (TP, AA 8:310) 
   
 See Cavallar (113-115). He reads Kant as transitioning away from a preference for a coercive world 2
federation (in the work prior to 1790s) to a non-coercive federation in his Theory and Practice, 
Perpetual Peace and The Doctrine of Right. 
 Kleingeld writes, “Kant does advocate the establishment of a non-coercive league of states…, but he does 3
so for reasons that both make good sense within the framework of his political theory and are 
compatible with the stronger ideal of a state of states” (305). Similarly, Cavallar says, “The true Kantian 
endorses a free federation of states. Kant was aware of the fact that this federation could not guarentee 
peace. Therefore he hoped that a world republic with public coercive laws might evolve at a later stage 
of development” (130).
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Under the second reading, which absolutely denies the Völkerstaat, this analogy is 
somehow imperfect. There must be some difference between the domestic and 
international state of nature that explains why one requires a coercive sovereign and the 
other does not. Yet, the exit from the state of nature is so central to Kant’s political 
philosophy, and this analogy is so consistent throughout the international writings, that it 
seems wrong to ignore the Völkerstaat as its logical consequent. Both the second and 
third readings see the Völkerstaat as required in Kant’s system because the same reasons 
that call for a domestic state ultimately call for the formation of an international state.  4
 Despite the formidable argument that his analogy represents, this essay will support 
the second reading of Kant’s international system of right. Kant absolutely denied the 
necessity of the Völkerstaat, and this denial is consistent with his broader views. The 
problem with past argument is that it has focused on the denial or support of the 
Völkerstaat, rather than developing   Kant’s positive arguments for the Völkerbund. The 
Völkerbund is an important international institution in Kant’s system, and only by 
understanding the role it plays in the international context can the repudiation of the 
Völkerstaat make sense. I contend that the Völkerbund should be seen primarily as an 
 Commentators have further identified two primary arguments that Kant uses against the Völkerstaat and 4
neither seems complete. First, the Völkerstaat is disfavored on practical grounds—it just could not work 
without descending into despotism. Yet, as Cavallar notes, “Does not Kant repeatedly argue that true, 
pure ideas in the moral and legal world retain their dignity and should be endorsed, regardless of their 
possible realization?” The empirical fact on the nature of world-state should not tarnish the rational 
ideal. Second, Kant suggests that there is a logical contradiction in the idea of a ‘state of nations’ 
because the Völkerstaat would dissolve all states into a single structure, and hence it would be 
meaningless to have a doctrine for the rights of nations (Zef, AA 8:354). Yet, commentators have also 
shown that just as individuals maintain sovereignty in the domestic case, a minimalist Völkerstaat can 
both maintain sovereignty in issues of war and ensure a system of national rights.
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international legislative authority—a worldly instantiation of the cosmopolitan general 
will. While the Volkerbund also consists of a judiciary to interpret international law and 
arbitrate disputes, it differs from a Völkerstaat because it lacks any coercive executive 
power to enforce international law.  
 My argument will move in two stages. In §§1-3, I will show that by establishing an 
international legislature in the Völkerbund, Kant achieves his two primary goals without 
a Völkerstaat. First, Kant overcomes the mutual legitimacy of force characterized by the 
state of nature. The laws that are established and promulgated by the Völkerbund 
establish a rightful condition while still maintaining the executive sovereignty and 
freedom of nations. Second, the establishment of the Völkerbund promotes perpetual 
peace as a reasonable hope. Since there is no coercive international executive, the world-
federation cannot guarantee peace, but Kant did not seek perfect guarantee. In the second 
stage of the paper, I will address the primary arguments that favor the Völkerstaat. In §4, 
I will address an important passage from Towards Perpetual Peace that seems to cut 
against my argument, and I will explain what differentiates the international state of 
nature from the domestic state of nature in §5.  
1. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE VÖLKERBUND  
The first step in the argument is to understand the role that the Völkerbund plays in 
international right, and how it differs from a Völkerstaat. Put simply, the Völkerbund 
retains the legislative and judicial roles that are familiar from states, yet the Völkerbund 
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does not have an executive that enforces the law. On first look, it seems strange to 
suppose the existence of a legislature without an executive because Kant refers to these as 
two of the three necessary authorities of a state. However, the Völkerbund is specifically 
not a state, and the absence of an executive is primarily what distinguishes it.  
 The Völkerbund should be understood only as the representative for a cosmopolitan 
general will, which decides on issues of international law and promulgates this law to 
states. When Kant ridicules the people who do not recognize a “supreme legislative 
power” with the purpose of abolishing war, he asserts the need for such a legislature 
specifically (Zef, AA 8:356). In describing his right of nations, Kant describes the rightful 
conditions as: 
Of that external condition in which a right can actually be assigned to human 
beings can we speak of a right of nations; for, as a public right, it contains in its 
very concept the publication of a general will determining for each what is its 
own. (Zef, AA 8:383) 
   
For there to be a rightful condition at all, there must be a body that makes the general will 
determinate and public. The goal and purpose of the Völkerbund is to establish this 
rightful condition, which requires the establishment of a legislature that represents the 
cosmopolitan general will. The laws that are passed by this body are understood to set the 
determinate rights of states. The Völkerbund thereby determines what is each state’s own.  
 In establishing a rightful condition of law, the Völkerbund also establishes legal 
conditions under which disputes can be settled. For there to be determinate rights, there 
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must be an authority that has the normative power to interpret international law in 
particular cases. Therefore, the Völkerbund must also have a secondary judicial function. 
In the state of nature, conflicts between states can only be decided by force and war, yet 
in a rightful international condition there is the possibility of arbitration by lawsuit: 
The right to go to war…is the way in which a state is permitted to prosecute 
its right against another state, namely by its own force, when it believes it has 
been wronged by the other state; for this cannot be done in the state of nature 
by a lawsuit (the only means by which disputes are settled in a rightful 
condition).    (MS, AA 6:346) 
Only by such a congress can the idea of a public right of nations be realized, 
one to be established for deciding their disputes in a civil way, as if by a 
lawsuit, rather than in a barbaric way…, mainly by war.           
 (MS, AA  6:351) 
   
In these passages, Kant outlines that war is the only way to decide conflicts outside of a 
rightful condition, but he recognizes that a rightful condition between states can be 
realized by the establishment of a congress. Once this rightful condition is in place, 
conflicts can be resolved by arbitration rather than by war. In such cases, disputes of 
international law will be decided by the Völkerbund, which applies its previously 
established laws to the particular case. In this way, the Völkerbund further determines 
what the rights of states are by interpreting the cosmopolitan law. 
 So, the Völkerbund should be understood as the representative for the 
cosmopolitan general will in the form of a legislature and judiciary, however there is no 
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executive function that enforces the law or judicial decisions. While this might seem like 
a surprising suggestion, I will better explain how the Völkerbund satisfies two important 
conceptual gaps in Kant’s international political philosophy without coercion. In §2, I 
show that by establishing a worldly instantiation of the cosmopolitan general will, a 
lawful and rightful condition holds. In §3, I will address a number of more pragmatic 
reasons to hope that the Völkerbund will promote peace. 
2. THE THEORETICAL ROLE OF THE VÖLKERBUND: MAKING PUBLIC RIGHT DETERMINATE 
Commentators who insist on a Völkerstaat as necessary argue that a Völkerbund without 
coercive power would be an ineffective agent of international Right . Prior to Jürgen 5
Habermas’s famous essay, Kevin Dodson claimed, 
Kant’s proposed league is devoid of any real political authority, for it lacks the 
power to promulgate and enforce public laws on its members, such as is 
established by a civil constitution. The absence of legislative authority has far-
reaching consequences for the viability of Kant’s project.        
       (Dodson 6-7) 
  
Dodson is here correct that the proposed league lacks the power to enforce laws on its 
members, but he is wrong when he states that it lacks the power to promulgate laws or a 
 Pauline Kleingeld, with the lessons of UN practices likely in mind, explains this worry as; “Strong states 5
will behave opportunistically, subjecting the interests of weaker state to their own, using the league as an 
instrument of foreign policy when this is useful to them, and quitting or simply disregarding the league 
when it is not”(Kleingeld 314). Outfried Höffe, doubts the feasibility of a non-coercive world-state when 
he writes, “This lack of all public force may be welcomed by the individual state in their attempts to 
guard their sovereignty. But as a solution to the problem of legal security it contradicts the fundamental 
thesis of Kant’s ethics of the state: the legal disputes are to be settled by an impartial and sufficiently 
powerful third party” (Hoffe 195).
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legislative authority. It is precisely those two functions that give the Völkerbund its 
limited power. The Völkerbund is not meant to guarantee security in the way that most 
expect—hostile inclinations are constantly in danger of breaking loose. The Völkerbund 
is meant to satisfy those conditions necessary for a cosmopolitan right to exist. Only such 
a federation can both satisfy (1) the requirements of public right, and (2) the requirements 
for a rightful condition. So while Dodson and Habermas are correct to criticize the 
Völkerbund as relatively ineffective, that criticism  ignores the primary moral role that 
the Völkerbund plays.  
 First, the Völkerbund is needed in order to issue the edicts that establish public right. 
Kant divides rights into two types; innate and acquired; “An innate right is that which 
belongs to everyone by nature, independently of any act that would establish a right; and 
acquired right is that for which such an act is required” (MS, AA 6:238). In Kant’s 
system, the only innate right is freedom, so all other rights must be established by an act. 
The Völkerbund is the institution through which those acts can occur and international 
acquired-rights are established. Kant elaborates this purpose in a particular comparison to 
the domestic state of nature; 
it is true that the state of nature need not, just because it is natural, be a state of 
injustice (iniustus), of dealing with one another only in terms of the degree of 
force each has. But it would still a state devoid of justice (status iustitia 
vacuus), in which when rights are in dispute (ius controversum), there would 
be no judge competent to render a verdict having rightful force.       
                 (MS, AA 6:312) 
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Without the Völkerbund, there is no means by which to determine the public right at all. 
As a legislative body, the Völkerbund can issue edicts that resolve the general disputes in 
rights, and through an interpretative judiciary can resolve particular disputes through 
arbitration. Once a legislative Völkerbund is formed, there will there be a competent 
judge with the power to issues  “verdicts having rightful force.” In this way, the world is 
no longer in a state devoid of justice.  
 Second, the only situation under which a rightful condition is possible is “in 
accordance with the idea of a will giving laws for everyone” (MS, AA 6:306). To satisfy 
this requirement, a legislative Völkerbund is necessary as the instantiated approximation 
of the general will. As Kant makes explicit in the closing paragraphs of Towards 
Perpetual Peace, the existence of a right of nations requires such a rightful condition;  
The condition under which a right of nations as such is possible is that a 
rightful condition already exists. For without this there is no public right, and 
any right that one may think of outside of it (in a state of nature) is instead 
merely private right. Now we have seen above that a federative condition of 
states having as its only purpose the avoidance of war is the sole rightful 
condition compatible with the freedom of states.          
              (Zef, AA 8:385) 
  
As nations come together to form the Völkerbund, they abandon the state of nature and 
the mutual legitimacy of force. They establish the rightful condition under which they 
come to have a cosmopolitan right, and the principles of international right only now can 
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be said to rightly hold. As this passage shows, the “federative condition of states,” as the 
Völkerbund, is the “sole rightful condition” that Kant entertains. 
 Similarly, the Völkerbund is necessary as a body that can promulgate the edicts of 
public right. Kant maintains that Right is “conferred only by justice” and that justice can 
only come through publicity of principles (Zef, AA 8:381). In establishing a rightful 
condition, the Völkerbund also publicizes the edicts of international right, thus satisfying 
the “formal” constrain of Right (Zef, AA 8:381). So, Dodson is correct when he criticizes 
the Völkerbund for being unable to enforce public laws, but wrong when he suggests that 
it cannot promulgate them. While the Völkerbund cannot be as effective or as 
comprehensive as a Völkerstaat would be, it is not a useless apparatus. On the contrary, it 
is the device through which the international state of nature is dissolved. It does this not 
by enforcing rights, but by establishing and publicizing them. The security of these rights 
cannot be guaranteed, but only in this way can determinate rights even be said to exist 
and have moral force. 
   
3. THE PRACTICAL ROLE OF THE VÖLKERBUND: ADVANCING PEACE 
In the previous section, we saw how the Völkerbund fits within the conceptual scheme of 
Kant’s political apparatus, but that alone does not make the Völkerbund an adequate 
model for cosmopolitan right. There must still be some reason to believe that the 
Völkerbund offers hope for achieving peace. In support of the reading that I have thus far 
offered, Kant does devote much of “Towards Perpetual Peace” to addressing this exact 
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need. He focuses on three particular mechanisms that promote peace; moral politicians, 
commercial greed, and the natural magnetism of right. These aspects of international 
relations are crucial because they explain how—even without a coercive Völkerstaat—a 
stable and peaceful international order is a reasonable hope. In each of these cases, we 
see that the public standard of right supplied by the Völkerbund nudges nations closer 
towards perpetual peace.  
 First, the Appendix of “Towards Perpetual Peace” introduces Kant’s idea of the moral 
politician as he discusses how morality and prudential politics can be conjoined, “I can 
indeed think of a moral politician, that is, one who takes the principles of political 
prudence in such a way that they can coexist with morals, but not of a political moralist, 
who frames a morals to suit the statesman’s advantage” (Zef, AA 8:372). He then goes on 
to explain that the moral politician takes the fulfillment of natural right as his own 
maxim, “even at the cost of sacrifices to their self-seeking inclinations.” This moral 
politician is motivated by duty even when the non-moral incentives are not present. The 
laws and public standard, which the legislative Völkerbund supplies, direct and 
coordinate such politicians when they exist. A clear and non-arbitrary conception of 
public right allows moral politicians to better promote the cause of peace by clarifying 
what specific actions are required. 
 Second, the first supplement of Perpetual Peace is dedicated to the various natural 
mechanisms that encourage long-term peace. This section is meant to show how “what 
man ought to do in accordance with laws of freedom but does not do, it is assured he will 
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do” (Zef, AA 8:365). The first natural device that Kant appeals to, ironically enough, is 
how the self-interest of individuals allows for a system to be built that leads to peace. In 
this fact, Kant sees that nature wills the end of peace because even that which seems most 
inimical to it, pure self-interest, can be bent for the purpose of Right. Kant correctly 
anticipates that the “power of money may well be the most reliable of all the powers…to 
promote honorable peace” (Zef, AA 8:368). In what might be the most prescient 
observation of the essay, Kant suggests that the nature of commerce and process of 
globalization will produce a series of incentives for peace that arise not from duty, but 
from greed. The Völkerbund aligns with this incentive towards peace in two ways. First, 
commerce can only flourish is a stable and peaceful international order, and insofar as the 
Völkerbund is peace-making organization it will curry favor from those who wish to gain 
from the stability. Second, the public laws and Right are able to establish the international 
norms that make commerce possible. By setting a public standard for business 
transactions, commerce has the reliable background conditions needed for success.  
 Third, Kant devotes much of his essay to explaining how the concept of Right is 
important to even prudential politicians. He scolds philosophers such as Grotius, 
Pufendorf and Vattel for providing justification for waging war because he believes that 
even prudential politicians care about justifying themselves;  
“This homage that every state pays the concept of right (at least verbally) 
nevertheless proves that there is to be found in human beings a still greater, 
though at present dormant, moral predisposition to eventually become master of 
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the evil principles within him (which he cannot deny) and also to hope for this 
from others.”        (Zef, AA 8:355) 
Furthermore, he suggests that this homage is inescapable, and rather than repudiate the 
concept of Right as meaningless, politicians “give it all the honor due to it, even if they 
should think up a hundred pretexts and subterfuges to evade it in practice” (Zef, AA 
8:376). For this reason, the decisions of the legislative Völkerbund hold even more 
weight because prudential politicians are no longer able to twist and alter the concept of 
Right to their advantage. These politicians will still pay homage to the right, but now that 
Right has a public standard, such homage will actually advance the cause of peace.  
In order to understand the argument here, it is important to see that Kant does not 
treat perpetual peace as guaranteed but merely as a goal worthy of hope. Kant focuses his 
arguments on getting towards perpetual peace because he believes that nations will never 
fully achieve a stable and everlasting peace. However, people will be able to come ever 
closer and closer to it. If the coercive Völkerstaat was the final ideal for global affairs, 
then we would reach actual perpetual peace through its constitution—as in the domestic 
case. Yet, this is not how Kant frames the issue; he does not aim to show how permanent 
peace can actually be achieved but only how it can be approached;  
So perpetual peace, the ultimate goal of the whole right of nations, is indeed an 
unachievable idea. Still, the political principles directed toward perpetual peace, 
of entering into such alliances of states, which serve for continual approximation 
to it, are not unachievable. Instead, since continual approximation to it is a task 
based on duty and therefore on the right of human beings and of states, this can 
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certainly be achieved.”                                                                         
(MS, AA 6:350) 
  
Without the Völkerstaat, there will always be a possibility that war breaks out. Yet, even 
with this possibility, the Völkerbund is a more reliable guarantee of freedom than any 
necessarily despotic Völkerstaat. The Völkerbund of perpetual peace is admittedly a 
shaky, limited structure, but over time it will allow nations to crawl closer and closer to 
the ideal. The legislative Völkerbund is the ideal way to pursue and approximate peace. 
4. KANT’S ARGUMENT FOR THE VÖLKERBUND 
In the introduction, I contrasted my reading of Kant’s international political philosophy 
with two rival interpretations. In the first interpretation, Kant’s political philosophy 
ultimate requires a coercive Völkerstaat, despite what might seem like denial. In the third 
interpretation, the Völkerbund is a transition towards an eventual Völkerstaat. In support 
of these readings, commentators have offered a positive argue that centers on one 
important passage from Towards Perpetual Peace; 
In accordance with reason there is only one way that states in relation with 
one another can leave the lawless condition, which involves nothing but war; 
it is that, like individual human beings, they give up their savage (lawless) 
freedom, accommodate themselves to public coercive laws, and so form an 
(always growing) Völkerstaat (civitas gentium) that would finally encompass 
all the nations on earth.                      
      (Zef, AA 8:357  rev.) 
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Kleingeld, Cavallar and Höffe all direct attention to this passage to demonstrate that the 
Völkerstaat is Kant’s ideal.  This is the solution that is most in “accordance with reason,” 6
and hence forms the highest goal in Kant’s rationalistic system. These commentators feel 
that this passage and others like it show that the Völkerbund is only a temporary solution 
to a problem that can only be permanently solved by a Völkerstaat 
 In support of my reading, I need to better explain why the above passage does not, 
actually, call for the formation of the Völkerstaat. To do so, I want to direct attention to 
the passage that immediately follows the Kleingeld/Cavallar/Hoffe quotation, and which 
better explains the Völkerbund’s role;  
But, in accordance with their idea of the right of nations, [peoples] do not at all 
want [the Völkerstaat], thus rejecting in hypothesi what is correct in thesi; so (if 
all is not to be lost) in place of the positive idea of a world republic only the 
negative surrogate of a league that averts war, endures, and always expands 
can hold back the stream of hostile inclination that shies away from right, 
though with constant danger of its breaking out.      
         (Zef, AA 8:357 rev.) 
  
This passage contains Kant’s most explicit argument for the Völkerbund—though in a 
complicated and twisting way. First, Kant identifies the crucial factor that leads to the 
repudiation of the world-state as the fact that peoples “do not at all want” the Völkerstaat. 
Here, Kant gives the determining power to the will of the peoples; it is because they do 
not want the Völkerstaat that it is denied. At first, this seems too a posteriori for Kant’s 
  Hoffe: pg 198, Kleingeld: pg 306, Cavallar: pg 1226
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political philosophy. As he writes, “it is just the general will given a priori (within a 
nation or in the relation of various nations to one another) that alone determines what is 
laid down as right among human beings” (Zef, AA 8:378). Whether Right requires a 
world-state should seemingly be settled by pure reason. On second look, however, it is 
not clear why we should see the claim that people “do not at all want” the Völkerstaat as 
a posteriori. I suggest that we read this as a claim about the “general will given a priori.” 
If the general will given a priori does not at all want the Völkerstaat, then that is 
sufficient reason why it is inconsistent with International Right just as Kant seems to treat 
it as sufficient reason in the passage. 
 The reason to understand why the general will (given a priori) would not want the 
Völkerstaat can also be understood by looking at the details of Kant’s practical 
philosophy. First, we should remember that the universalization test for the FUL has two 
phases, one formal and one conative. Even if it is logically possible to have a maxim 
against helping others, for example, one cannot will that no one ever help him. The 
failure of such a maxim is not purely formal but involves the knowledge that the costs of 
never receiving help are too large for it to be reasonably willed. Similarly, even without 
any formal constraints against national anarchy, this surely cannot be willed. The cost of 
anarchy is just too high for agents to will the dissolution of the national state. Oddly 
enough, the opposite holds for the international sphere. The costs of having a Völkerstaat 
are too high for agents to will its formation. After all, it is not just likely that such a 
- !  -16
INTERNATIONAL RIGHT AND KANT’S WORLD-FEDERATION  
system would descend into despotism and anarchy, but it is a “law of nature” (Guyer: 
2000 417).  
 In each of these cases, the issue is not decided a posteriori by a vote of the world 
demos. It is “willed” because it would be unreasonable to will such burdens onto oneself. 
I suggest that this explains the “rejecting in hypothesi what is correct in thesi.” That 
which is correct “in thesi” is the establishment of the Völkerstaat—as outlined in the 
Kleingeld/Cavallar/Hoffe quotation above. However, because the general will “alone 
determines what is laid down as right among human beings,” and because the general 
will “does not at all want” a world-state, the Völkerstaat is rejected “in hypothesi.” 
 Staying with the passage, Kant does not treat the rejection of the world-state as an end 
to the argument. In Kant’s political philosophy, the exit from the state of nature is of 
foremost importance. When Kant writes that “(if all is not to be lost),” he means that all 
would be lost if international society remained in the state of nature, and it is out of this 
necessity that the Völkerbund is born. Since (P1) agents must exit the state of nature and 
(P2) the most effective means—a Völkerstaat—is too costly, then (C) “in place of the 
positive idea” of a Völkerstaat Kant introduces “the negative surrogate of a league.” The 
goal of this negative surrogate is still the same as the positive idea: to “hold back the 
stream of hostile inclination that shies away from right.” Just as with a national state that 
aims to use coercion to temper unrightful inclination, the Völkerbund as negative 
surrogate has the same explicit purpose. By establishing an international condition of law, 
the Völkerbund is able to overcome the international state of nature. However, this 
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condition is not as perfect as the domestic state because there remains a “constant 
danger” of hostile inclinations “breaking out.” 
5. BREAKING THE ANALOGY   
In the last section, I gave some reason to see why the analogy between the domestic and 
international states of nature is not perfect. In order to show that the Völkerstaat is not the 
necessary result for international society, this analogy must be fully addressed. As stated, 
the most significant difference is in the general will; in the case of the domestic state of 
nature, the general will resoundingly favors the state over anarchy, while in the case of 
the international state of nature, the general will rejects a world-state. For Kant, it is clear 
that such a “soulless despotism, after it has destroyed the seeds of good, finally 
deteriorates into anarchy” (Zef, AA 8:367), hence it would be unreasonable to will its 
formation. Yet, this dissimilarity—while perhaps sufficient—is not the only way to 
distinguish the domestic and international state of nature. 
 First, Kant has importantly distinct concerns in mind for the domestic and 
international situations. In domestic Right, Kant is focused on three issues; property, 
contract, and civil relationships. With international Right, Kant is concerned with only 
one; ending war. As he writes in Perpetual Peace, “a federative condition of states having 
as its only purpose the avoidance of war is the sole rightful condition” (Zef, AA 8:385). 
For Kant’s system of international right, it is adequate to assume that states can regulate 
domestic right themselves. The Völkerbund would grant states the internal sovereignty to 
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decide such issues, and only regulate the external actions that states take. For this reason, 
the Völkerbund does not need to have the extensive structure that the domestic state must. 
As Kant himself says in regard to the analogy: 
What holds in accordance with the natural right for human beings in a lawless 
condition, “they ought to leave this condition,” cannot hold for states in 
accordance with the right of nations (since as states they already have a 
rightful constitution internally and hence have outgrown the constraint of 
others to bring them under a more extended law-governed constitution in 
accordance with the concept of right).                              
                                                              (Zef, AA 8:355) 
Because the states have already established domestic Right, the Völkerbund is concerned 
only with ensuring peace. Besides, the republican states under the Völkerbund’s law are 
already disposed to avoid war. The legitimacy of the Völkerbund acts mostly as a 
coordination mechanism towards peace, minimizing the need for any coercion.  
 The limited concern of international Right is even more important for the claim to 
coercion that the Völkerstaat would make. When supporters of the Völkerstaat advocate 
for coercive rights, they are claiming the right to wage war for the sake of ending war. 
Any such justification is questionable. As Kant writes, “the first question is: what right 
has a state against its own subjects to use them for war against other states, to expend 
their good and even their lives in it” (MS, AA 6:344). Likewise, we ask what right the 
Völkerstaat has against its cosmopolitan citizens to use them for war on rogue states. As 
in the domestic case, this right may only come from the consent of the governed (MS, AA 
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6:345). If the consent is present, then an alliance of states themselves are able to wage a 
just war in accordance with the edicts of cosmopolitan right, and the Völkerstaat is 
rendered extraneous. When this is the case, those that support war are more likely to 
suffer its costs than those that are merely at the command of the Völkerstaat. Seeing the 
Völkerstaat in this light shows the significant differences between domestic and 
international cases. 
 A Hobbesian reading of Kant’s political philosophy might motivate those who favor 
the Völkerstaat as necessary for justice. While these two great thinkers differ 
extraordinarily, they both agree on the importance of the exit from the state of nature. 
Furthermore, they recognize that this necessity is tied intricately to the use of sovereign 
force. In so far as readers are motivated by Hobbesian commitments, it is helpful to also 
see the distinction that Hobbes himself draws between the domestic and international 
spheres of justice. 
In all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their 
independency, are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture of 
gladiators..., which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby the 
industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it the misery that 
accompanies the liberty of particular men. (L78) 
Hobbes too recognized meaningful differences between the domestic and international 
states of nature—in particular the greater misery involved in the domestic case. I 
maintain that such differences are crucial in understanding why the analogy between the 
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international and domestic context is not perfect. There are important conceptual and 
practical differences that should affect any theory.  
 In Kant’s political philosophy, effectiveness is not the primary criterion that 
determines global political organization. On the contrary, Kant recognizes that peace is 
impossible to guarantee. Kant’s international political structure is more focused on 
establishing the conditions under which legitimate rights can be said to exist. While the 
Völkerbund may not be a perfect international structure, it is accepted because it the 
solution most in accordance with the cosmopolitan general will. Since such a limited 
structure still replaces the legitimacy of force with the legitimacy of cosmopolitan law, 
the international state of nature is dissolved through a public standard of Right. 
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